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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
LLOYD MORRIS, JUDY K. MORRIS, :
Plaintiffs,

:
Case No. 20000010-CA

and GREAT WEST CASUALTY
COMPANY,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
:

Priority No. 15

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant/Appellee.

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is taken from an order of the Third Judicial
District Court, dated December 3, 1999 (R. 112-13), which granted
summary judgment against Great West for failure to file a notice
of claim under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

Great West

filed a timely notice of appeal on December 30, 1999 (R. 119-20)
and an amended notice on January 6, 2000 (R. 123-24), which
corrected the case caption.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)

(1996) gives this Court jurisdiction over the appeal by order of
transfer from the Supreme Court of Utah dated February 23, 2000.

ISSUE PRESENTED UPON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The sole issue before the Court is whether the insurer of a
damaged, company-owned semi-tractor can evade the notice-of-claim
requirement of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act by relying
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solely on the notice filed by the semifs driver in his own behalf
for personal injuries he sustained in an accident while driving
the insured semi.

The driver's notice, while alluding to the

damage to the semi, made no reference to either the semi's owner
or its insurer.
Standard of Review;

"When reviewing summary judgment

determinations, [the court] review[s] for correction of error,
considering the facts and inferences in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party."

Tallman v. City of Hurricane, 1999 UT

55, Hi, 985 P.2d 892; see also Petersen v. South Salt Lake City,
1999 UT 93, 1|2, 987 P.2d 57.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes,
and rules pertinent to the issue before the Court is contained in
the body of this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition
Below
Plaintiffs Lloyd and Judy Morris filed the original

complaint in this case on February 10, 1999 (R. 1-8).

The

complaint alleged that an accident in which the semi-tractor
driven by Lloyd Morris struck a cow on a state-controlled highway
was caused by the negligence of the Utah Department of
Transportation (UDOT) and resulted in serious injury to both

2
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plaintiffs.

Five weeks later, an amended complaint was filed

(R. 23-31), adding appellant Great West Casualty Company as a
plaintiff and a new subrogation claim of $42,492.50 on its behalf
for damage to the semi, which was owned by M&P Transportation
(R. 28, H1 22-25).

After filing its answer (R. 34-43), UDOT

moved for summary judgment against Great West (R. 71-72),
asserting in its supporting memorandum (R. 73-79) that Great
West's cause of action should be dismissed for failure to file a
notice of claim.

In response (R. 87-93), Great West argued that

because Lloyd Morris' notice of claim stated that "damage to
claimant's semi exceeds $48,000.00" (R. 79)--even though
"claimant" was clearly identified in the notice as "Lloyd Morris"
(R. 78), and the notice made no mention of Great West--Morris'
notice was effective to fulfill any notice obligation on Great
West's part.

By minute entry of November 18, 1999, the district

court granted UDOT's motion "based upon the analysis and
authorities set forth in Defendant's memoranda in support and in
reply" (R. 110). An order to the same effect was entered on
December 3, 1999 (R. 112-14), and a stipulated dismissal of the
Morrises' claims was filed on December 21, 1999 (R. 117-18).
This appeal followed (R. 119-20; R. 123-24).
B.

Statement of Relevant Facts
In their memorandum opposing summary judgment, plaintiffs

agreed that the facts on which UDOT's motion was based are
undisputed (see R. 88). They are as follows (R. 73-74 and the
documents referenced therein):
3
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On October 20, 1997, Lloyd Morris was driving a semi-tractor
on Interstate 80 in Tooele County.
in the vehicle.

Judy Morris was also riding

The semi struck a cow in the road and rolled,

injuring the Morrises and damaging the vehicle, which was owned
by M&P Transportation and insured by Great West.
compensated M&P for the damage.

Great West

Neither Great West nor M&P filed

a notice of claim pursuant to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
On May 13, 1998, Lloyd Morris, as claimant, filed a notice of
claim through his attorney, Mitchell R. Jensen, which states:
"The damage to claimant' s semi exceeds $48,000.00.

Claimant

alleges his injuries and property damage are the direct and
proximate result of an improperly maintained fence which allowed
the animal to stray onto the highway" (R. 74, % 6 ) .

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Utah case law has consistently held that the notice-of-claim
provision of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act requires strict
compliance.

Under the act, any person who has a claim against a

governmental entity must file a written notice of claim, signed
by the claimant or the claimant's attorney.

Under the rules of

statutory construction, "person" includes corporations and
companies.

Therefore, Great West Casualty Company, as a "person"

with a claim, was obligated to file its own notice.

Moreover,

Great West's argument that UDOT received actual notice of its
claim is of no significance.

Case precedent has conclusively

I
4

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

established that actual notice does not relieve a plaintiff of
the duty to file a notice of claim.
Great West attempts to circumvent this requirement by
arguing, for the first time on appeal, that Lloyd Morris was, at
all times, its agent (see Aplt. Brief at 4) and the agent of M&P
(see id. at 8 ) . However, it fails to identify any legal elements
of agency authority or to cite evidence of record demonstrating
an agency relationship with Mr. Morris.

In addition, because it

made no mention of an agency theory in the district court, its
argument is waived for purposes of appeal.
Great West misapprehends Moreno v. Board of Education.
Unlike the foster parents in Moreno, Lloyd Morris has no
demonstrated authority, by statute or otherwise, to maintain an
action or file a claim for Great West's benefit.

Moreover, the

subrogation theory under which Great West brought its claim
permits it to stand only in the shoes of the entity whose loss it
was legally obligated to pay.

The loss paid here was the loss

sustained by M&P, the owner of the semi, not the loss sustained
by Lloyd Morris.
For these reasons, as more fully explained below, the
summary judgment in UDOT's favor must stand.

5
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ARGUMENT
I. THE DRIVER'S NOTICE OF CLAIM FOR HIS PERSONAL
INJURIES WAS INADEQUATE TO FULFILL THE STATUTORY
REQUIREMENTS OF NOTICE FOR THE INSURER OF THE COMPANYOWNED SEMI-TRACTOR.
The requirements for a notice of claim are clearly spelled
out in statute.

Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11,

(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a
governmental entity, or against its employee for an act
or omission occurring during the performance of the
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or
under color of authority shall file a written notice of
claim with the entity before maintaining an action,
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise
to the claim is characterized as governmental.
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth:
(i) a brief statement of the facts;
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted;
and
(iii) the damages incurred by the
claimant, so far as they are known.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (Supp. 1999). In addition, the notice
must be "signed by the person making the claim or that person's
agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian11 (Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-11(3)(b)(i) (Supp. 1999)).
The notice of claim filed by Lloyd Morris fails to provide
adequate notice of Great West's claim in several particulars.
First, by listing only Mr. Morris as claimant (R.. 78), the notice
fails to disclose Great West as a "person having a claim" under
the statute.1

Second, no facts in the notice reveal the nature

!

It is beyond dispute that Great West is a "person" for
purposes of the statute. Under the rules of statutory
construction, "[p]erson includes individuals, bodies politic and
corporate, partnerships, associations, and companies." Utah Code
Ann. § 68-3-12(2) (o) (Supp. 1999).
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of Great West f s claim, its subrogation interest as insurer of the
company-owned semi-tractor.

Finally, the notice is not signed by

anyone purporting to act on Great West's behalf.

In fact, Great

West concedes in its brief that it did not retain the Morrises'
attorneys to represent it until September 23, 1998, more than
four months after Lloyd Morris filed his notice of claim (see
Aplt. Brief at 7 ) . Under these facts, Lloyd Morris' notice
cannot serve as notice on Great West's behalf.
Great West bases its argument on the ground that Lloyd
Morris' notice gave UDOT actual notice of the property damage
claim, allowing UDOT to conduct a timely investigation (see Aplt.
Brief at 7-8).
default.

However, actual notice cannot cure Great West's

As Utah's supreme court has repeatedly held, "'[a]ctual

knowledge of the circumstances . . . does not dispense with the
necessity of filing a timely claim.'"

Sears v. Southworth, 563

P.2d 192, 194 (Utah 1977) (quoting Varoz v. Sevev, 29 Utah 2d
158, 506 P.2d 435, 436 (1973); see also Scarborough v. Granite
Sch. Dist., 531 P.2d 480, 481-82 (Utah 1975).

Further, in these

cases, the actual, though ineffective, notice of the incidents
giving rise to the cause of action was given directly to the
defendant by the affected party.

By contrast, Great West did not

attempt to give any notice of its claim to UDOT prior to joining
with the Morris plaintiffs in their lawsuit.

If even direct,

actual notice by the claiming party to a potential defendant
cannot substitute for a formal notice of claim, the incidental
mention of property damage to a vehicle not owned by the claimant
7
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driver here cannot be deemed adequate to apprise UDOT of Great
West's subrogation claim.
II. THE NATURE OF A SUBROGATION CLAIM DOES NOT PLACE
GREAT WEST IN THE SHOES OF THE SEMI-TRACTORf S DRIVER.
"Subrogation is an equitable doctrine that allows a person
or entity which pays the loss or satisfies the claim of another
under a legally cognizable obligation or interest to step into
the shoes of the other person and assert that person's rights."
Educators Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Allied Property and Cas. Ins. Co.,
890 P.2d 1029, 1030 (Utah 1995).

In the case at bar, the

undisputed facts show that Great West's subrogation claim permits
it to stand in the shoes of the insured semi-tractor's owner,
whose loss it paid, but not its driver.

As Great West explains

in its brief,
In the present case, on or about October 20, 1997,
Lloyd Morris was driving a semi-tractor owned by M&P
Transportation ("M&P") and insured by Great West.
While driving the semi-tractor eastbound on 1-80 Lloyd
Morris struck a cow resulting in personal injury to
both he [sic] and his wife Judy Morris and property
damage to the semi-tractor. Following the incident,
Great West paid M&P' s claim for property damage to the
semi-tractor. Great West then asserted its subrogation
claim against UDOT for reimbursement of the
approximately $48,000 paid on the property damage
claim.
Aplt. Brief at 7 (emphasis added).

Under the facts admitted by

Great West, the subrogation doctrine permits it to stand in the
shoes of M&P, whose claim it satisfied under its legally
cognizable obligation as M&P's insurer.

However, there is no

evidence of record that M&P made any claim or filed any notice
against UDOT; in fact, Great West admitted below that neither did
(

8
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(see Statement of Relevant Facts at 3-4, supra).

Consequently,

Great West having filed no notice of its own, its subrogation
claim fails.
The injuries sustained by the Morrises, which were the
subject of timely notices of claim, do not change this analysis.
Great West does not assert that it paid or was under any legal
duty to compensate the Morrises for their injuries.

Therefore,

it has no legally cognizable interest in the suit between the
Morrises and UDOT.
In short, neither Great West nor its insured, M&P, gave
appropriate written notice of their property damage claim to
UDOT.

The Morrises, who filed individual notices of claim, have

no valid claim for damage to M&P's insured property, and their
notices neither mentioned Great West or M&P nor listed them as
claimants.

Great West is consequently in default of the

statutory notice provision that is a mandatory prerequisite to
suit.

On these grounds, the district court granted summary

judgment in UDOT's favor, and Great West has failed to
demonstrate error in the court's decision.
III. THE MORENO CASE INVOLVES A STATUTORY RIGHT TO SUE
ON ANOTHER'S BEHALF THAT IS NOT PRESENT IN THIS CASE.
Great West places its reliance exclusively on Moreno v.
Board of Education, 926 P.2d 886 (Utah 1996), to demonstrate that
a notice of claim filed by one party can suffice to raise the
interest of an unnamed individual who is the actual party in
interest.

In Moreno, the legal guardians of a minor child sued

for the child's wrongful death, not naming the natural mother as
9
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a plaintiff, and the supreme court held the guardians1 notice of
claim sufficient to provide notice of the natural mother's
claims.

While a superficial reading of Moreno may suggest a

factual similarity to the case at bar, the underlying legal
analysis reveals its inapplicability to Great West's claim.
The Moreno case involved two separate opinions.

The first

involved extensive legal analysis of the statutes governing the
guardians' right to sue and concluded
that while the rights and responsibilities of a
guardian flowing out of legal custody of the ward
terminate upon the death of the ward, the guardian's
ability to maintain an action for the wrongful death of
a minor flows from the guardian's residual duty of
accounting and does not terminate upon the minor's
death. This obligation is not for the personal benefit
of the guardian, but is among a guardian's residual
duties upon the death of his ward, and therefore any
wrongful death action must be brought in behalf of the
ward's heirs.
Moreno, 926 P.2d at 890.
analysis.

All five justices agreed with this

Two justices further concluded on the basis of this

analysis that the guardians' notice of claim, specifically filed
on their own behalf, was legally insufficient to raise the
interests of the unnamed natural mother.
justices concluded to the contrary.

The remaining three

However, the linchpin of

their conclusion was the guardians' statutory authorization to
maintain suit on the heirs' behalf:

"Since section 78-11-6

authorizes a guardian to maintain an action for the wrongful
death of his ward, it follows that the guardian has the authority
to file the prerequisite notice of claim."

Id. at 892.

<

10
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In the present case, Great West has pointed to no statute
which gives the driver of a semi-tractor authority to file a
notice of claim on behalf of the insurer of a vehicle in which
the driver has no insurable interest.

Great Westf s belated

assertion to the contrary, Lloyd Morris' notice of claim gives no
indication that he is filing on Great West's behalf as its agent,
attorney, parent, or legal guardian.

There is no indication that

Lloyd Morris had the authority to negotiate or compromise Great
West's claim.

In fact, there is no mention of Great West at all.

To the contrary, Great West openly declares at the end of its
brief that "the claim was filed by Morris on his own behalf
rather than in a representative capacity for M&P or Great West"
(Aplt. Brief at 10).
Plaintiff's agency claim fails not only factually, but
procedurally.

"This court will not consider issues raised for

the first time on appeal absent plain error or exceptional
circumstances."

York v. Shulsen, 875 P.2d 590, 594 (Utah App.

1994); accord Connor v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 972 P.2d 414, 418
(Utah 1998); Utah Med. Prods., Inc. v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228,
233-34 (Utah 1998) .

Great West has not cited the record to show

that the agency issue was raised below, and on appeal, it has not
argued either plain error or exceptional circumstances that would
justify consideration of the issue by this Court.

Further, "[i]t

is well established that an appellate court will decline to
consider an argument that a party has failed to adequately
brief."

Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 313 (Utah 1998);

11
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see also State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, 1 11, 974 P.2d 269.

As in

that case, Great West here not only fails to cite the record, but
refers to no legal authority in support of its agency claim.

Its

cursory mention of agency is insufficient to fulfill Great West's
duty under Utah R. Civ. P. 24(a)(9):

"The argument shall contain

the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the
issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue
not preserved in the trial court, with citations to authorities,
statutes, and parts of the record relied on."
Moreno is further distinguishable from Great West's case.
In Moreno, the basis of the natural mother's cause of action,
wrongful death, was the same ground that the guardians raised on
their own behalf.

Here, the basis of Great West's cause of

action, damage to the semi-tractor, diverges completely from the
basis of the Morrises' personal injury claims and requires
completely different evidence to sustain.

There is simply no

factual identity between Great West's and the Morrises' claims.
Finally, in Moreno, the supreme court noted that the
statutory scheme provided for the maintenance of only a single
action, for the benefit of the heirs, that could be brought by
either the guardian or the heirs themselves (see 926 P.2d at
889), making the guardian legally capable of filing the requisite
notice (see id. at 892).

In the present case, because the .

grounds for their claims are distinct, both the Morrises and
Great West could have maintained separate actions.

The lack of

identity between Great West's and the Morrises' claims
12
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distinguishes it both factually and legally from the single claim
raised in Moreno.

For this reason, Moreno cannot serve as

precedent to save Great West from its duty of notice.

CONCLUSION
At bottom, Great West's argument is simply that because UDOT
had actual notice, through Lloyd Morris' notice of claim, of the
damage to the semi-tractor, UDOT can show no prejudice to its
interests that justifies dismissal of Great West's claim.

As

discussed above, the defendant's actual knowledge of a claim does
not relieve a plaintiff of its notice obligation.

No showing of

prejudice on UDOT's part is necessary to overcome Great West's
procedural default.

Because Great West did not file a notice of

claim, its action cannot go forward, as the district court
correctly concluded.

Because Great West has not shown error in

this conclusion, UDOT respectfully requests the Court to affirm
the district court's Order Granting Summary Judgment Against
Plaintiff Great West Casualty Company.

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION
Because there is little case law addressing the meaning of
Moreno v. Board of Education, defendant believes oral argument
would assist in clarifying its scope.

Consequently, defendant

respectfully requests both oral argument and a published opinion
in this case.

13
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DATED this

(,^-Hy, day of April, 2000.

NANCY I>. KEMP
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
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